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Newspaper Libel
Marcus D. Gleisser*
T O A GOOD NEWSPAPER REPORTER, having a big story and not be-
ing allowed to publish it is a crime akin to smothering a
vigorous newborn baby before it has a chance to give forth its
first healthy howl. To a responsible city editor, however, sitting
alone with a meager handful of libel mores and facing the wrath
of a senior editor if he incurs a lawsuit which could have been
avoided, the torture of indecision over that big story can be wrack-
ing indeed.. First of all, he is a good reporter whose training and
personal inclination cry to get that big story into print before the
competition hears of it. Secondly, at the same time, he must be
cautious to sift out all elements of libel danger even to the extent
of killing the story if necessary. The conflict is obvious, and often
it comes just before an edition deadline that calls for a quick
decision.
It must be understood from this that a good newspaperman
rarely leaps recklessly into the whirlpool of libel. By the same
token, it can also be understood that many times he is drawn into
that whirlpool quite unwittingly and innocently, simply by not
knowing what its ramifications are. Often, indeed, lawyers them-
selves are caught by surprise by decisions handed down by courts
in various fact situations.
Cases to be cited below in this article will show that libel's
line of danger in many instances is vague even to legal experts
with specialized training and ample time for research and medi-
tation. For journalists in their ceaseless race against time, and
harried by competition, perforce relying on many sources for
valuable information, the phantom of libel can be most trouble-
some.
Making this problem even more disheartening is the perma-
nency of the printed word. True, as Justice Cardozo is reported
to have said, what gives the sting to writing is its permanence of
form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written one abides and
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perpetuates the scandal. True, too, that the honestly-written error
cannot be waved away as a transitory thing that was "misunder-
stood" by the listener. Nor can it be denied. The day after the
writing, when much of the momentary heat of inspiration has
begun to fade, the printed word remains clear and bold to chal-
lenge the writer.
Small wonder, then, that many a writer who is convinced
that he has a story which he feels must be brought to the public's
attention to correct a wrong walks cautiously under this ever-
present cloud of danger. Times without number he has received
quotes in good faith from what he considered a reliable source,
only to have that source retreat when the results of his words
have been more than he anticipated. The unrecorded speech
faded with the air, while the writer's words have remained to
plague him. Sometimes, fear of this dilemma has left unwritten
stories that should have been told; and wrongs that should have
been corrected have gone unrevealed.
The Law
What then is this problem of libel, this tort with a double
edge that can both protect the rights of the individual and, at the
same time, bring about a situation in which that same individual
stands to suffer a great loss? The definition of the law is de-
ceptively simple. It concerns itself with the defamation of persons
through printed words or signs and pictures. In general, a libel
could be defined as a false written statement about a person
which would tend to bring that person into public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or to injure him in his business or job.
That would seem to be a simple, clear definition. It is, in fact,
so simple that law cannot leave it alone but goes on in an attempt
to make it more specific. It divides libel into per se and per quod.
Under libel per se are placed those statements which falsely
accuse a person of suffering from some loathsome or contagious
disease, or which falsely accuse a person of want of capacity or
fitness to conduct his business or profession, or which falsely
accuse a person of the commission of a crime involving moral
turpitude or making such a person liable to a punishment in-
famous in character, or which upon their face bring disgrace or
ridicule upon the party accused. Libel per quod, on the other
hand, must be supplemented by allegation and proof of other
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facts to identify the plaintiff if the printed matter does not itself
do so, to prove the defamatory effect upon the plaintiff, to estab-
lish actual malice, and to show special damage.
With a more or less clear picture of libel before us, yet one
which surely cannot be as clear and understandable to a news-
paperman as it is to a lawyer with his background of case study,
the next question is: What defense is available to the writer?
The first defense in Ohio, as it is in most other states, would seem
quite obvious-the truth. The fact that the truth is a complete
defense is stated in the Ohio Constitution' and in the Ohio Re-
vised Code.2 The latter puts it this way: "In an action for a libel
or a slander, the defendant may allege and prove the truth of the
matter charged as defamatory. Proof of the truth thereof shall
be a complete defense. In all such actions any mitigating circum-
stances may be proved to reduce damages ...
Pure proof of truth, again, is too simple and clear an answer
to remain untouched. Other corollary theories have sprung up.
For example, there is the theory of fair comment. Obviously,
everyone has the right to criticize or comment, both by spoken
and written word, on matters of public interest and general con-
cern. However, it is apparent that these statements must be made
fairly and honestly. They could not, for example, be used to ac-
cuse public officials or candidates of criminal acts nor to attack
the private character of a public person falsely. An Ohio case
which illustrates this is Menger v. The News Printing Co.,3 in
which it was held that:
"... The essential elements of fair comment in order to be
deemed not actionable are: (1) that the publication is an
opinion; (2) that it relates not to an individual but to his
acts; (3) that it is fair, namely, that the reader can see the
factual basis for the comment and draw his own conclusion;
and (4) that the publication relates to a matter of public
interest."
There is yet a third defense to libel which is known as privi-
leged communications or statements which contain matter which
would be libelous were it not for the occasions on which they
were made. This can best be illustrated by two sections of the
Ohio Revised Code:
1 Ohio Const., Article I, Sec. 11.
2 Ohio R. C., Sec. 2739.02.
3 Lewis C. Mengert v. The News Publishing Company, 16 Ohio Circ. Ct.
(N. S.) 34 (1908).
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Sec. 2317.04 holds that a fair and impartial report of the
proceedings before state or municipal legislative bodies, or
officers, or a fair synopsis of any bill, or other document pre-
sented, usually is privileged unless it can be proved that such
publication was done maliciously.
Sec. 2317.05 holds that an impartial report of an indict-
ment, warrant, affidavit, or arrest is privileged, unless it is
proved that an element of maliciousness tinged that publi-
cation.
The third phase of the law of libel covers the problem of dam-
ages. Where it is a case of libel per se, the plaintiff usually does
not have to prove any actual damages either to himself or his
reputation, because the law presumes damages as a result of the
mere publication of the statements. Actual damages can also be
recovered on proper proof. Usually malice is presumed in such
cases, but proof of the existence of actual and express malice can
bring punitive damages in addition to compensatory. Where it is
libel per quod, however, the plaintiff must prove actual money
loss in order to recover. Here, too, the plaintiff can get punitive
damages if he can prove actual malice or gross negligence in the
publication.
This, then, is a general, albeit very brief, picture of the law
of negligence in libel. Of necessity, lack of space prevents dis-
cussion of many fine points such as privileged communications
among small, intimate groups or in family relationships. The pur-
pose of this brief outline is to set the backdrop of the stage on
which will be displayed the confusing nature of the court de-
cisions.
The Problems
First let us take an instance where a matter would seem
clearly libelous. Take the story in New York where a housewife
appealed to a court when her husband beat her as punishment
for taking their children to a late movie against his wishes. The
husband, in turn, complained that his wife watched television so
much that it interfered with her normal household duties. The
New York Mirror saw fit to treat this story in a flippant manner
under the headline: "Video Widower's Wife Shows Movie
Mouse."
Seemingly this attempt to make light of a serious domestic
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol5/iss2/9
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
difficulty would appear to be grounds for a good libel action. The
court, however, dismissed the libel action and said:
4
"The defense was privileged in that the paper was accu-
rately reporting what had transpired in the Magistrate's
Court. The complaint of the husband, the agreement to shut
off the television at 11: 30, the magistrate's efforts to patch up
family differences and the wife's complaint against the hus-
band for giving her a black eye, these were the essence of
the story. The coloration of the facts, flippant though it was,
was by way of fair comment."
The court added:
"If any rule can be deduced from the cases in this area
of libel, it appears to be that the imputation must carry with
it a charge of serious vice, disgraceful behavior or scandalous
misconduct of such dimensions as to make proof of special
damages unnecessary."
Or take criticism by newspapers of men performing their
jobs to the best of their capabilities, a criticism that can have an
effect on livelihood. The Daytona Beach (Fla.) News-Journal
charged that a practicing attorney had filed a petition which, in
the newspaper's opinion, challenged the attention of all citizens
who believed in law enforcement. The attorney, the newspaper
said, "made grave accusations against some of our police officers
in his zeal to save his client from going on trial on charges grow-
ing out of a fracas ... Did the attorney have any right to accuse
these policemen of dastardly behavior? For our police to be sub-
ject to criminal accusations for acting in the line of duty is revolt-
ing to decent citizens . . ."
At first glance, this would indeed seem a serious charge
against an attorney whose obligation to the public is as significant
as his obligations to his clients. It would seem apparent that with
the emphasis upon moral fitness and public obligation which the
legal profession demands, to ascribe unethical conduct to a law-
yer is to impugn his fitness to practice the legal profession.
Here, however, is what the majority opinion of the court
said: 5
"Our study of the article brings us to the view that it con-
stituted a criticism of a system by which the attorney, acting
within bounds, but within bounds the writer thought should
be contracted, had succeeded in keeping a rascal from being
tried.
4 Dorothy Bedekovich v. Hearst Corporation, 141 N. Y. Supp. 2d 651 (1955).
5 Isham W. Adams v. News Journal Corporation, 84 So. 2d 549 (Fla., 1955).
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"Although by use of our 'common mind' we can under-
stand how irked the attorney may have become by the com-
ment on the procedure that irked the editor, we do not find
from the whole editorial and such of the circumstances of its
publication as are apparent in the record, the qualifications
which would stamp it as libelous in itself."
To see how elusive is this line of danger in libel, consider
now another decision by the same court, where John Walsh, a
policeman, sought to dismiss a libel action against the Miami
(Fla.) Herald. His motion was set aside by the state's supreme
court6 with the comment that the offending story did "certainly
impugn the creditability of the subject of the article in stating
that he offered testimony before a justice of the peace 'exactly
the opposite' to his own report (of a fatal auto accident), that he
'pushed forward in his zeal' to do it and that the justice acted as
if he put little or no reliance in the testimony given."
The court said: "At least the matter contained in the publi-
cation tended to subject this man to distrust and since it is part
of the official duty of a policeman to testify and ergo, to testify
truthfully when called, a publication such as this tends to injure
him in his trade."
A rather fine point in the vagaries of libel lies in the problem
of indirect aspersion or an injury by innuendo. An example of
this is a suit brought against the El Paso (Tex.) Times by Stanley
Caufield, an attorney and member of the legislature. The action
was based on a story about hearings on charges of alleged gam-
bling payoffs. The offending part of the story read:
"Caufield helped push the gambling probe which resulted
from affidavits made by Mrs. Pearl Johnson. She charged
that certain El Paso men were receiving payoff money. Mrs.
Johnson now is serving a 15-year penitentiary sentence at
Huntsville for the murder of her new-born child."
Caufield contended that, by innuendo, the story charged him
with initiating and pushing an investigation against a judge, a
prosecuting attorney and another attorney based solely upon the
affidavit of a "self-confessed prostitute and convicted murderess."
In the ruling of the trial court, which was upheld by the
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, it was held: 7
6 John Walsh v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 80 So. 2d 669 (Fla., 1955).
7 Stanley Caufleld v. El Paso Times, Inc., 280 S. W. 2d 766 (Tex., 1955).
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"We do not see any innuendo that this attorney solicited
false affidavits from Pearl Johnson or that he consorted with
her on any basis. Further we think that the ordinary reader
would expect information as to gambling payoffs to come
from persons other than a class that is the elite."
A good question in libel arises over the amount of latitude a
newspaper may take upon itself in the criticism of public officials.
Generally, this latitude is pretty wide and falls under the scope
of fair comment and criticism discussed in the preceding section.
Two cases will exemplify this question of proper criticism. In
one, the El Paso (Tex.) Herald Post was sued on a story head-
lined: "Mayor's Retirement Plan Aimed at One Employe." The
part on which the libel suit was based read: "Mayor Hervey put
his policy of forced retirement for employes at the age of 65 into
effect to get rid of one employe, he said at a Pension Board meet-
ing yesterday. During discussion of a request to allow a 68-year-
old employe to work an additional 13 months so that he would
be eligible for a city pension Mayor Hervey said, 'After all we
only passed the 65-year-old rule to get rid of one employe.'"
In ruling on this, the Texas court said: 8
"We first wish to point out that publications about public
officials are treated differently than publications about pri-
vate individuals, in that even a rather vigorous and untrue
condemnation of an official as an official is not libelous in it-
self unless it charges him with an offense for which he may
be removed from office, whereas the same condemnation of a
private individual might be libelous in itself."
The court added:
"If one is accused of doing something or standing for some-
thing that he may legally or properly do, then such state-
ment, not being defamatory, would not be the basis for libel-
ous action even though it may be hurtful to him in some other
way.))
In the second case, the Gastonia (N. C.) Gastonia Citizen
published an editorial headed: "Hardly A Bargain At $30 A
Front Foot" and severely criticized the purchase of a piece of
property by the city for $3,000. The editorial concluded: "We
may be a lone voice speaking out against such wisdom and non-
arbitrated use of the taxpayers' money but we still believe-with
or without the sewage line-that this deal stinks."
8 Herald-Post Publishing Company v. Fred Hervey, 282 S. W. 2d 410 (Tex.,
1955).
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The mayor brought suit in which he claimed that the edi-
torial was malicious and false, that it charged him as well as the
city councilmen with malfeasance and misconduct, humiliated and
disgraced him and that the publisher, although requested to do so,
refused to apologize.
In its decision that the newspaper's charge was not libelous,
the court wrote: 9
"The article does not charge and the complaint does not
allege that the mayor exerted or attempted to exert any in-
fluence, improper or otherwise, upon the council or did or in-
tended to do anything more than give his verbal support to
their decision. The article, when fairly and impartially con-
strued, does not have the meaning the plaintiff seeks to give
it. The editor of the paper charges the wasteful, not corrupt,
use of public money. The expenditure of public money is a
matter of judgment and to charge the council with bad judg-
ment is not libelous. One of the functions of a newspaper is
to give information about public affairs and how public offi-
cials are carrying on the public business. So long as that
qualified privilege is not abused an action for libel cannot be
maintained."
Headlines, Stories Are Not a Unit
An interesting facet of newspaper procedure with which the
general public, and the legal profession, is often too little ac-
quainted is the manner in which newspaper stories and their
headlines come together. Too few persons know, for example,
that while stories are written by one group of men, the headlines
are written by a completely different group on the newspaper.
Thus, for example, attempting to sue a reporter for libel that ap-
pears only in the headline over his story would, in effect, be
naming an altogether innocent defendant. This is particularly
true in attempting to sue a wire service, which provides only the
text material, for libel in the headline which is written by each
individual newspaper which purchases that story.
This was made clear in a recent suit of Marteney v. United
Press Association, in Kansas, 10 where the charge of libel was
based not only on the dispatches of the association but on the
headlines of the stories carried by the newspapers.
9 W. Harrelson Yancey v. David E. Gillespie and Spindle City Publishing
Company, Inc., 87 S. E. 2d 210 (No. Car., 1955).
10 Wayne S. Marteney v. United Press Association, 224 F. 2d 714 (C. A. 10,
1955).
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The news dispatch to Kansas and Colorado papers said, in
part:
"Topeka Attorney General Harold Fatzer said today
Wayne Marteney, president of a Garden City grain company,
now in bankruptcy, has crossed the border into Mexico.
Marteney, whose million-dollar grain empire fell apart, is
charged with seven violations of the Kansas Warehouse Law
and is free under $5,000 bond."
A number of newspapers based their headlines on this ap-
parently libelous matter and the plaintiff sought to include these
headlines in his allegations of libel.
The United States Court of Appeals,11 however, said:
"The press association should be held responsible only for
its own acts and the defamation it disseminates. A press as-
sociation has no control over the headlines which a news-
paper uses in connection with its dispatches. The headline is
an independent act of the newspaper publisher. We think it
would be manifestly unfair to a press association to hold it
accountable for the headlines."
It must be emphasized, however, that this blanket of im-
munity cannot be extended to cover the dispatch itself for, as the
court concluded:
"Considering the publication as a whole we think the
plain and natural meaning it would convey to the average
reader is that Marteney, having been charged with seven vio-
lations of the penal laws of Kansas and being free on bond,
had fled to Mexico to avoid prosecution and that it was not
fairly susceptible of any other meaning. We concluded there-
fore that the publication as a natural and immediate conse-
quence would cause injury to Marteney and is therefore libel-
ous in itself."
An Ohio View on Court Records
To this writer who, as a newspaper reporter, has been regu-
larly assigned to cover the activities of the Cuyahoga County civil
courts, a particularly disturbing question has been the extent to
which a reporter can safely go in reporting the contents of a peti-
tion on file in a court.
These petitions seemingly become the domain of the general
public when they are filed. Practically anyone having business
with a case can walk into the courthouse and peruse its petitions.
11 Ibid.
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As a reporter, it has always been this writer's practice to examine
these petitions carefully for any news value they might contain.
Yet a Cleveland newspaper recently lost a directed verdict and a
judgment of $2,500 for publishing accurately the contents of such
a petition.
The case was that of Mary Pringle Williams v. the P. W.
Publishing Co., Inc., publisher of the Cleveland Call & Post. Mrs.
Williams alleged that she had filed a divorce petition in the Cuya-
hoga County Common Pleas Court against her husband and that
in his answer her husband set forth certain statements which
were indecent and which the Call & Post published. She added
that those statements were false and to the great damage of the
plaintiff's character and reputation, for which she sought $50,000.
The defendant in its answer first set forth a general denial
and then five affirmative defenses which, in effect, declared that
the defendants in good faith published verbatim the answers con-
tained in the answer of the defendant in the divorce case. They
did not publish more than was contained in this answer, and they
claimed the publication was privileged under section 2317.05 of
the Ohio Revised Code.
In ordering a directed verdict for the plaintiff, Common Pleas
Judge Benjamin D. Nicola cited Syllabus 2 of the Ohio Supreme
Court in Mauck v. Brundage12 which read:
"In an action for libel the question whether the publica-
cation is or is not libelous per se is a question for the court
and where the publication is claimed to be privileged the
question whether or not the occasion gives the privilege, the
controlling facts being conceded, is also for the court."
Judge Nicola told this writer that the action of the court
necessitated the construction of Revised Code section 2317.05
cited by the defendants. This section reads:
"The publication of a fair and impartial report of return
of any indictment . . . or the filing of any pleading or other
document in any criminal or civil cause in any court of com-
mon jurisdiction or of a fair and impartial report of the con-
tents thereof, is privileged ... this section ... of the Revised
Code does not authorize the publication of blasphemous or
indecent matter."
Judge Nicola, under his construction of this section, held the
allegations set forth in the petition to be indecent and ruled that
12 Mauck vs. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89 (1903).
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the acts set forth therein were libelous per se. He thereupon di-
rected the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff for compen-
satory damages only, which would include a reasonable attorney
fee.
In supporting his opinion, Judge Nicola cited 15 Ohio Reports
320 in which it was held that:
"Words spoken of a female and having a tendency to
wound her feelings, bring her in contempt and prevent her
from occupying such position in society as is her right as a
woman, are actionable in themselves."
New York and Non-Public Proceedings 13
An interesting development in the legal theory of privilege
in the question of libel comes to light in a change made in New
York State's libel law. It came into being with the approval of
Gov. Averill Harriman.
Drafted as the aftermath to two successful libel suits against
New York City newspapers, the statutory revision now provides
for a pleading of privilege on matter in an official proceeding even
though that proceeding may not be public. Previously, damages
had been awarded by juries where newspapers published in-
formation contained in documents filed in closed proceedings.
Here is how the governor's memorandum explained the
change, which the legislature apparently enacted with a push
from newspaper interests:
"The law presently affords the defense of privilege in an
action for libel to one who publishes a true and fair report
'of any judicial, legislative, or other public and official pro-
ceedings.' This bill would amend the law by deleting the
reference to 'public.' In other words, it would make it pos-
sible to publish, as in a newspaper, a report of a judicial,
legislative or other official proceeding even though it is not
public.
"However, it should be noted that our statutes contain
many provisions which preserve the secrecy of documents
and testimony, such as in matrimonial actions, the secrecy of
testimony before a grand jury, or statements made by a
grand juror during the deliberations of the grand jury. There
are other comparable safeguards in the Executive, Legis-
lative and Tax Laws and in other laws.
"My approval of this bill cannot and should not be con-
strued as a modification or weakening of the justifiable pro-
tections embodied in the laws mentioned. In the light of all
13 Editor & Publisher Mag., p. 52, col. 3 (May 5, 1956).
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these circumstances the bill before me appears to be reason-
able. Undue restrictions upon the freedom of the press are
not advisable."
Invasion of Privacy
Still another problem facing journalism in its daily race for
news in the public interest is that of invasion of privacy, a com-
paratively new idea in law which has not yet gained complete
acceptance and which might be regarded as an offspring of the
older tort of libel.
In theory, at least, this concept seeks to prevent the unwar-
ranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the
publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no
legitimate concern, and the wrongful intrusion into one's private
activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suf-
fering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 14
While this is a sound legal concept, this writer has seen it
bandied about and hurled at news reporters by known hoodlums,
racketeers and other unsavory characters rounded up as suspi-
cious persons by the police, until the theory becomes very ques-
tionable in actual practice.
Actually, while much of the public may not know it, a certain
degree of its privacy is protected by law. For example, there
are strict rules about invading quarters and the tapping of tele-
phone wires. The publication of pictures of a person's humiliat-
ing illness is generally frowned upon. Putting a person's signa-
ture to a letter or including his picture in a rogues' gallery can
bring retaliation. And taking some elements of a person's per-
sonality for commercial use without his consent, such as adver-
tising, can result in liability for damages.
But to ask newspapers to waive their constitutionally pro-
tected freedom to publish newsworthy items of public interest-
or to stop newspapers from reporting the private life of a person
who has achieved the status of a public figure-is certainly ask-
ing too much.
Let us look at what must be the roots of such a tort as "inva-
sion of privacy." It would of necessity often be based on the
ground of mental suffering, a ground to which courts should be
exceedingly careful about giving general recognition. Up to now
the courts have been most suspicious of an injury that is more
mental than physical, and with good reason. Unless checked by
restraining laws, suits based on unprovable "mental pain" can
14 138 A. L. R. 32.
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rise in a mighty wave and not only engulf all the newspapers and
other periodicals, but all the courts as well, and open a new and
endless tide of litigation. In this writer's opinion, the invasion-
of-privacy tort is indeed a Pandora's box which legislators and
courts dare to throw wide open only with great peril to the
public welfare.
Conclusion
The problem of the law of libel is not an easy one. 15 This
article has attempted to show that the line of danger-the line
beyond which a newspaper cannot step without facing time-con-
suming, costly and, often, embarrassing, law suits-is a nebulous
thing. It is a thing that wavers and changes on minute details,
and is a thing on which editors and writers, untrained in legal
theories, find it hard to find secure footing.
Yet it is an elusive thing by necessity. This writer would
surely not advocate a loosening of the laws to the point where
the dignity of the individual can be trodden upon with impunity.
The present scope of communications, and the widening area to
be expected in the future, make journalism far too powerful an
instrument to go completely unrestrained. In the hands of the
irresponsible its potential for injury would be great.
On the other hand, however, its legal shackles must never
be made tight and inflexible if the individual's dignity and free-
dom are to be upheld and protected. For a journalism timid and
in fear of legal reprisals at every move would become a pallid
thing. It would lack the vigor of criticism and the drive to bring
to light matters not only of the public's domain but basic to the
survival of our economic and social system. In such a situation,
while some individuals might enjoy a measure of revenge or su-
premacy over a powerful instrument, they and untold millions
of others may suddenly awaken one day to find that they have
fettered themselves, and freed forces for evil a hundredfold more
terrible than those they sought to suppress.
While general principles of protection may be set up as they
have been in the past, they should not be as stern and uncom-
promising as a sword in the hand of the law. For this sword, as
has here been shown, can be most terribly two-edged. It would
hold as much peril for the wielder as for the intended victim.
15 See, for detailed discussions, Gatley, Libel and Slander (4th ed., 1953);
Odgers, Libel and Slander (5th ed., 1911); and for an excellent discussion
with many late citations, Julian v. American Business Consultants, 2 N. Y.
2d 1, 137 N. E. 2d 1 (1956).
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